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TRUSTS-TERMINATION-PROOF OF IMPOSSIBIUTY OF IssuE-The surviving trustee of a testamentary trust petitioned the probate court for
authority to terminate and distribute the trust in accordance with a compromise agreement between all interested persons apart from the possible
issue of one beneficiary. Undisputed medical testimony was received that
neither the beneficiary nor his wife were capable of procreation. On a
question of law certified to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, held,
remanded with instructions to terminate and distribute the corpus of the
trust. Termination of a trust in prejudice of the interests of possible future
issue is permissible when the possibility of such issue is demonstrably
negligible. In re Bassett's Estate, 190 A.2d 415 (N.H. 1963).
The traditional view, a product of a medically less sophisticated society,
is that any human being is conclusively presumed at law to be capable of
bearing children until death. Mentioned earlier by Sir Edward Coke in
the context of the fee tail,1 this irrebuttable presumption was firmly
established as part of the common law by Lord Kenyon in Jee v. Audley.2
Aside from the influence of the Biblical narrative of Isaac's birth to venerable parents,3 the indelicacy of the inquiry and the inconclusiveness of the
medical evidence were the primary moving considerations.4

1 COKE, COMMENTARY UPON 1.rrrizroN 28a.
2 l Cox !124, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
8 Genesis 17:17, 21:5 (to Abraham, aged one
4 ll POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 847 (1952).

hundred, and Sarah, aged ninety).
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With regard to the termination of trusts, 5 the marketability of titles,6
and the Rule Against Perpetuities,7 the great majority of American courts
passing on the question have adopted the common-law conclusive presumption. Significantly, however, ever since the leading case of United States v.
Provident Trust Co., 8 the presumption has been held rebuttable in the
more pragmatic area of taxation.9 The English courts, moreover, having
reversed themselves since Jee v. Audley, consistently hold the presumption
rebuttable by, clear evidence in all contexts except the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 1 Further, several American courts have recently expressed
dissatisfaction with the conclusive presumption,11 one jurisdiction apparently having reversed an earlier acceptance of the rule, 12 while several
others have narrowed its applicability through liberal interpretation.13
In the principal case, therefore, the court has adopted a distinct minority
view in holding the presumption rebuttable when the question is the
termination of a trust, and it is virtually alone in suggesting that it would
hold similarly when confronted with the Rule Against Perpetuities.14

°

5 See, e.g., P v. Wilmington Trust Co., 188 A.2d 361 (Del. Ch. 1962); Byers v. Beddow,
106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932). Contra, White v. Weed, 87 N.H. 153, 175 Atl. 814 (1934),
reaching the result of the principal case although not considering the question in detail.
6 See, e.g., Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941); Shepherd v. Moore,
283 Ky. 181, 140 S.W.2d 810 (1940). Contra, Whitney v. Groo, 40 App. D.C. 496 (D.C. Cir.
1913), holding a title marketable where the only objection was that children thereafter
born to a seventy-year-old widow would be entitled to an interest in the property.
'1 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust &: Sav. Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425
(1920); Letcher's Trustee v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W.2d 984 (1946); McPherson v.
First &: Citizens Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954).
8 291 U.S. 272 (1934).
9 See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 794 (1943).
10 See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 794 (1943); Annot., 67 A.L.R. 538, 543 (1930).
11 In a jurisdiction which has long accepted the conclusive presumption, it was
recently suggested that if a situation sufficiently compelling were presented, it might
relax the rule. McPherson v. First&: Citizens Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 19, 81 S.E.2d 386, 398
(1954). Other courts have indicated that they were following the rule only because of the
authoritative precedent. See, e.g., P v. Wilmington Trust Co., 188 A.2d 361 (Del. Ch. 1962).
12 The early Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483
(1877), holding the presumption conclusive, was widely cited. There followed other
decisions in that court holding similarly. See, e.g., Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 150
Atl. 159 (1930). However, all of the recent decisions of the lower Pennsylvania courts have
held the presumption rebuttable. See, e.g., Bowen Estate, 3 Pa. D. &: C.2d 401 (Philadelphia
County Ct. 1955); Case Estate, 84 Pa. D. &: C. 123 (Bucks County Ct. 1952); Kelby Estate,
80 Pa. D. &: C. 1 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1952). The large number of these recent
clear holdings strongly indicates that the rule has been modified, although the highest
state court has not reversed itself.
13 A growing body of decisional law has avoided the conclusive presumption through
construction of the instrument, finding intent to create interests only in favor of those
alive when the instrument spoke. REsrATEMENT, PROPERTY § 377, comment b (19-H);
Newhall, Nibbling at the Rule Against Perpetuities, 29 Mass. L.Q., Oct. 1944, p. 29; see,
e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140 Conn. 332, 99 A.2d 224 (1953).
14 Principal case at 417. One other case in relation to the Rule Against Perpetuities has
refused to follow what it termed the "absurd" doctrine of the conclusive presumption of
fertility. Exham v. Beamish, [1939] Ir. R. 336.
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Nonetheless, the principal case is in accord with a very substantial segment
of modem judicial thought.11•
Modem medical knowledge, frequently supplemented by statistical
studies,16 makes evidence as to the possibility of issue extremely reliable.17
While distrust of medical evidence once dictated a contrary policy, it would
seem today that a court, exercising its discretion in prescribing the proof
required, could confidently decide the question of impossibility of issue.18
Any remaining doubts regarding the possibility of error prejudicial to
unborn beneficiaries would seem to be adequately removed by requiring a
bond, which in tum should prove inexpensive due to the relative certainty
of the medical sciences. 19 The second policy consideration of the early
cases, that of the indelicacy of the inquiry into the ability to procreate,
likewise seems inapplicable today, as modem courts routinely conduct
even more "indelicate" inquiries.20
Additional policy reasons favoring the conclusive presumption have
recently been advanced. In addition to several questionable arguments
premised on considerations of uniformity, 21 the concern has been promi111 See notes 9-13 supra. A recent commentator on the principal case stated that it was
"a giant step in the direction of realism . • ••" Leach, Perpetuities: New Hampshire
Defertilizes the Octogenarians, 77 HARV. L. REv. 279, 283 (1963).
16 For example, a compilation from the yearly CENSUS BUREAU BIRTH STATISTICS, Live
Births, table 4, reveals that of 28,938,636 births in the United States between 1923 and
1936, only 3 were to women of 55 or over. A similar compilation from CENSUS BUREAU
VITAL STATISTICS, General Tables-Live Births for the decade 1951-1960 reveals that .003
percent of the births were to women aged 50 or over.
17 Case Estate, 84 Pa. D. &: C. 123, 130 (Bucks County Ct. 1952). See generally BEHRMAN
&: GOSLING, FUNDAMENTALS OF GYNECOLOGY (1959).
18 In practice the Pennsylvania and English courts have generally accepted expert
medical testimony. See, e.g., Kelby Estate, 80 Pa. D. &: C. I (Philadelphia County Ct. 1952)
(medical expert's testimony after exhaustive tests); Leonard's Estate, 60 Pa. D. &: C. 42
(Dauphin County Ct. 1947) (testimony based on age and atrophy of sexual organs).
Often the words "children" and "issue" do not include adopted children, notwithstanding statutes investing the adopted child with a right of inheritance. See Annot.,
144 A.L.R. 670, 674 (1943). In those jurisdictions in which they are included, the possibility
of adoption will also have to be considered. See Re Barker, II D.L.R.2d 146 (B.C. 1957),
refusing to terminate a trust partly on ground that it was not demonstrated that plain•
tiff was legally incapable of adopting a child.
19 The bond also affords wider latitude to a court's determination of what proof of
impossibility it considers sufficient. The Pennsylvania courts have generally considered
the proof of impossibility sufficient protection. Case Estate, 84 Pa. D. &: C. 123, 131 (Bucks
County Ct. 1952). They have, however, utilized the personal bond when the possibility
of issue is slight but more than negligible. See, e.g., Bowen Estate, 3 Pa. D. &: C. 2d 401
(Philadelphia County Ct. 1955).
20 The very same inquiry is made in cases of contested legitimacy and in tax cases.
Scott refers to the notion that the inquiry into fertility is indecent as "absurdly prudish."
3 Scorr, TRusrs § 340.1, at 2498 (2d ed. 1956).
21 The rather dubious argument has been noted in 23 Cow111. L. REv. 50, 53 (1923),
that since the presumption throughout the law is held irrebuttable when interests outside
those of the possible issue or of the persons alleging impossibility are involved, the presumption should always be held conclusive in the interest of uniformity. Even if true,
this is hardly consonant with the sound practice of permitting conclusive presumptions
only when very substantial reasons exist for them. 20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 160 (1939).
Holmes said that scrutiny of the ancient rules is justified and revision a right if the
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nent that a contrary holding might encourage mercenary operations rendering individuals irrevocably sterile.22 It would seem, however, that the
danger of voluntary submission, especially by a woman, to such an operation for material reasons is minimized by religious, psychological, and
legal deterrent £actors.2 s
The conclusive presumption is thus seen as an anachronism from the
days of Coke, supported only by dubious policy considerations and resting
principally on adherence to ancient precedent. In addition, a conclusive
presumption of fertility must inevitably result in the disruption of many
family estate plans and the frustration of reasonable expectations.24
Careful drafting may well avoid the problem in particular instances, but
given holographic wills, perfunctory lawyers, and the frequent probate of
wills drawn in other states, this solution is idealistic. Moreover, property
may be needlessly tied up for years. Having found only unconvincing
reasons supporting the conclusive presumption, and finding compelling
practical reasons to modify it, the court in the principal case would seem
to have reached the logical and preferable conclusion.
The American Law Institute supports the rule of the principal case in
every area except that of the Rule Against Perpetuities.25 The traditional
view has been almost unanimously criticized by legal scholars.26 American
courts have excepted the taxation area and have occasionally avoided its
application elsewhere.27 Now the principal case has expressly rejected the
various grounds of policy, ancient and modem, upon which the rule is founded are unsatisfactory. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 33 (Howe ed. 1963). It would seem that
uniformity could as well be sought in compliance with this principle. Haggerty v. City
of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 420, 326 P.2d 957, 965 (1958), noted that an argument
based on uniformity is especially strong for the Rule Against Perpetuities, which is said
to contain no "exceptions." In the light of such rules as the "Wait and See" doctrine,
this conclusion seems to tum upon a semantic point. Regardless, the rebuttable presumption certainly does not promote the predicability necessary to achieve absolute certainty
in the law. Cf. 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.22 (Supp. 1962). Practicality almost
certainly will demand at least one pure "exception" because of recent advances in biological sciences. The now real possibility of artificial insemination by refrigerated sperm
long after the sperm donor's death would seem to void many gifts.
22 E.g., Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932); Hill v. Sangamon Loan &:
Trust Co., 295 Ill. 619, 129 N.E. 554 (1920).
23 3 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 20, § 340.1. Besides the religious and social aspects,
several authors advance the psychological theory that, in a woman, the maternal has
priority over the material. E.g., BEHRMAN & GOSLING, op. cit. supra note 17, at 383; REIK,
OF LOVE AND Lus-r 524 (1959). Consider here also the very real possibility, and therefore
effective deterrent, that a court of equity might refuse relief because of "unclean hands."
Equity will not afford relief to one who has violated conscience or good faith. 2 PoMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 398 (5th ed. 1941).
24 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 24.22 (Casner ed. 1952).
25 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 274 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 340, comment
e (1959).
26 E.g., 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 24, § 24.22; BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 1007 (2d ed. 1962); 3 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 347; Leach, supra
note 15; 23 CoLUM. L. REv. 50 (1923); 34 M1cH. L. REv. 453 (1936).
27 See notes 9, 11-13 supra.
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traditional view. Legal opinion is thus increasingly adopting what appears
the preferable rule-a presumption of the ability to procreate rebuttable
by clear evidence. The strong judicial endorsement here given to the
view held by legal scholars should certainly have a wide influence on the
future course of litigation and decision.
Charles F. Niemeth

